Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for Customized Consumer Information * by Bounie, David et al.
HAL Id: hal-02288708
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02288708
Submitted on 15 Sep 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for
Customized Consumer Information *
David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck
To cite this version:
David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck. Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms for
Customized Consumer Information *. 2019. ￿hal-02288708￿
Data Intermediaries and Selling Mechanisms
for Customized Consumer Information∗
David Bounie,†Antoine Dubus‡ and Patrick Waelbroeck§
September 15, 2019
Abstract
We investigate the strategies of a data intermediary selling customized
consumer information to firms for price discrimination purpose. We an-
alyze how the mechanism through which the data intermediary sells in-
formation influences how much consumer data he will collect and sell to
firms, and how it impacts consumer surplus. We consider three selling
mechanisms tailored to sell customized consumer information: take it or
leave it offers, sequential bargaining, and simultaneous offers. We show
that the more data the intermediary collects, the lower consumer surplus.
Consumer data collection is minimized, and consumer surplus maximized
under the take it or leave it mechanism, which is the least profitable mech-
anism for the intermediary. We argue that selling mechanisms can be
used as a regulatory tool by data protection agencies and competition au-
thorities to limit consumer information collection and increase consumer
surplus.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal works of Hayek (1945) and Marschak (1974), scholars and
policy makers have acknowledged that information greatly enhances the effi-
ciency of markets. In the last two decades markets have however considerably
evolved with the rising of new intermediaries that supply consumer information
to firms willing to improve their business practices. Companies of a new type -
data intermediaries - have specialized in collecting data from different sources,
and selling customized datasets to firms.1 The emergence of this new market
for data intermediation raises two main concerns related to data protection and
competition policies.
First, data intermediaries have become major actors of the economy, up to
a point where, in 2014, the market for consumer data was valued around USD
156 billion per year (Pasquale, 2015). Recent scandals of data breaches and
violation of consumer privacy have revealed the huge amount of information
possessed by data intermediaries.2 For instance, in a study of nine data brokers
from 2014, the Federal Trade Commission found that data brokers have infor-
mation ”on almost every U.S. household and commercial transaction. [One]
data broker’s database has information on 1.4 billion consumer transactions
and over 700 billion aggregated data elements; another data broker’s database
covers one trillion dollars in consumer transactions; and yet another data bro-
ker adds three billion new records each month to its databases.” (Federal Trade
Commission, 2014, Data brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability).
The sheer volume of personal data collected by these data intermediaries raises
concerns for data protection agencies. Indeed, new regulations try to limit the
amount of personal data collected by data intermediaries. For example, the Cal-
ifornia Consumer Privacy Act provides a detailed list of safeguards to protect
personal data. Similarly, a (personal) data minimization principle is enacted in
1For instance, data brokers such as Equifax or Transunion, sell specific consumer segments
to firms willing to personalize their advertising campaigns.
2Huge data breach reveals hundreds of millions of emails and passwords from across the
Internet.
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the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in the US, and in the
General Data Protection Regulation in Europe.
Secondly, market practices have revealed that data intermediaries play a sig-
nificant role in shaping competition, which can cause important harms to other
companies and to consumer welfare. For instance, Facebook offered companies
such as Netflix, Lyft, or Airbnb special access to data, while denying its access
to other companies such as Vine.3 There is a risk that more precise consumer
information could lead to more consumer surplus extraction and to increased
market power in the data intermediaries’ industry.4 There is thus a pressing
need to analyze the strategies of data intermediaries.
The study of data intermediaries and their role on the data strategies of firms
is the subject of a new field of the literature. Two topics are of a particular
interest. The first is related to the impact of the selling mechanism on market
equilibrium. Economists have for long acknowledged that the way a product is
sold has a profound effect on the organization of markets (Riley and Zeckhauser,
1983). This literature has focused in particular on take it or leave it offers
(Binmore et al., 1986), and sequential bargaining (Rubinstein, 1982; Sobel and
Takahashi, 1983). Recently, Backus et al. (2018a), Backus et al. (2018b) and
Backus et al. (2019) empirically analyze patterns of bargaining on e-bay and how
bargaining environments are affected by information asymmetries, bargaining
power, and private characteristics on the buyer and on the seller’s side. Milgrom
and Tadelis (2018) study how machine learning is used to improve mechanism
design. Jindal and Newberry (2018) study in which case it is optimal for a seller
to use bargaining or fixed price to sell a good.
The second topic deals with the strategies of a data intermediary selling con-
sumer information for a given selling mechanism. Montes et al. (2018) consider
a data broker selling information to firms that allows them to first-degree price
3Facebook gave Lyft and others special access to user data; engadget, May 12th, 2018.
4See the recent debate on a potential breakup of major data intermediaries. (Is Big Tech
Too Big Or Not Big Enough?; Forbes, June 20th, 2019.; Warren Wants To Break Up Amazon,
Facebook, Google; Forbes, March 8th, 2019.)
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discriminate different consumer segments. The data intermediary auctions the
same consumer information to all active firms in the market. This assumption
has been recently challenged by Bounie et al. (2018) who allow the data broker
to sell customized consumer segments to firms, and show that selling all avail-
able information is not optimal for the data broker. An important conclusion
of that research is that with the recent advances in information technologies,
data intermediaries will propose customized information to firms. Auctions are
typically used to sell a standard product for which there are a large number
of bidders with different unknown valuations, but are not well suited to sell
customized information that fits the need of only one bidder.
In this paper, we complement the literature on information selling in two
respects. We first analyze three alternative mechanisms to auctions to sell cus-
tomized information to firms: a take it or leave it offer, a sequential bargaining,
and simultaneous offers. Secondly, we model a central activity of data inter-
mediaries that is ignored in the literature, data collection, and we analyze how
strategies of data collection affect the selling strategies of data intermediaries.
We contribute to the existing literature on two points.
Our first contribution is to propose a characterization of selling mechanisms
using the general notion of data contract. We define a class of independent data
contracts for which the choice of information sold to one firm is independent of
the choice of information sold to another firm. We show that the three main
mechanisms (sequential bargaining, take it or leave it and simultaneous offers)
belong to this class of independent data contracts and that they all lead to the
same number of consumer segments sold in equilibrium. We also show that the
key element that will determine how much information will be collected and
sold in equilibrium is the threat for a firm of being uninformed. This threat will
determine the willingness to pay of a firm for information, and thus the price
of information. This conclusion could not be reached in models where the data
intermediary is not selling consumer segments strategically.
4
Secondly, we endogenize the strategies of data collection of the data inter-
mediary, and we compare the amount of consumer data that the data interme-
diary collects under the different selling mechanisms. We show that the take
it or leave it offer maximizes consumer surplus and minimizes data collection,
but that the data intermediary would prefer simultaneous offers or sequential
bargaining that lead to a more intense collection of information, and in turn to
lower consumer surplus. We discuss the regulatory implications of these results
in the conclusion.
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. We describe the model in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the three selling mechanisms. We solve the game
in Sections 4 and 5. We discuss an alternative selling mechanism in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed on a unit line [0, 1]. They
purchase one product from two competing firms that are located at the two
extremities of the line, 0 and 1. The data intermediary collects and sells data
on consumer segments. An informed firm can set a price on each consumer
segment. An uninformed firm cannot distinguish consumer segments and sets a
single price on the entire line.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers buy one product at a price p1 from Firm 1 located at 0, or at a price
p2 from Firm 2 located at 1. A consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] receives a utility
V from purchasing the product, but incurs a cost t > 0 of consuming a product
that does not perfectly fit his taste x. Therefore, buying from Firm 1 (resp.
from Firm 2), incurs a cost tx (resp. t(1− x)). Consumers choose the product
that gives the highest level of utility:5
5We assume that the market is covered, so that all consumers buy at least one product
from the firms. This assumption is common in the literature. See for instance Bounie et al.
(2018) or Montes et al. (2018).
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u(x) =
 V − p1 − tx, if he buys from Firm 1,
V − p2 − t(1− x), if he buys from Firm 2.
This simple model of horizontal differentiation can be used to analyze the impact
of information acquisition on the profits of firms (Thisse and Vives, 1988).
2.2 Data intermediary
The data intermediary collects information on consumers that allows firms to
distinguish k consumer segments on the unit line. The data intermediary can
decide to sell all segments collected or only a subset of these segments. We will
show that the data intermediary never sells all available consumer segments.6
2.2.1 Collecting data
The data intermediary collects k consumer segments at a cost c(k). The cost
of collecting information encompasses various dimensions of the activity of the
data intermediary, such as installing trackers, or storing and handling data.
Collecting more information by increasing the number of segments allows a firm
to locate consumers more precisely, and thus increases the value of information.
For instance, when k = 2, the information is coarse, and firms can only dis-
tinguish whether consumers belong to [0, 12 ] or to [
1
2 , 1]. At the other extreme,
when k converges to infinity, the data broker knows the exact location of each
consumer. Thus, 1k can be interpreted as the precision of the information col-
lected by the data intermediary. The k segments of size 1k form a partition P,
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Partition P
6Previous research has assumed that the data intermediary sells all available information
(Montes et al., 2018). We show that this assumption is not valid.
6
2.2.2 Selling information
To present our argument in the simplest way, we assume that the data interme-
diary only sells information to Firm 17 using one of the three following selling
mechanisms: a take it or leave it offer, a sequential bargaining, and simultaneous
offers. We show in Section 6.2 that our results are robust to this assumption,
i.e. they hold when the data intermediary can sell information to both firms.
The data intermediary can potentially sell any subset of segments collected
in the partition depicted in Figure 1. It is easy to understand that selling all
consumer segments is not optimal for the data intermediary. On the one hand
thinner segments in the partition allow a firm to extract more surplus from
consumers. On the other hand selling more consumer segments also increases
competition because Firm 1 has information on consumers that are closer to
Firm 2, and can poach them (Thisse and Vives, 1988). For instance, if the
data intermediary sells all consumer segments, Firm 1 can set a price on the
consumer segment that is the closest to Firm 2.
Thus, an optimal partition must balance the competition and surplus ex-
traction effects. Consider partition P1 represented in Figure 2. Partition P1
divides the unit line into two intervals: the first interval consists of j1 segments
of size 1k on [0,
j1
k ] where consumers are identified so that Firm 1 can price dis-
criminate them. The data intermediary does not sell information on consumers
in the second interval of size 1− j1k , who remain unidentified, and firms charge
a uniform price on this second interval. The number of segments of identified
consumers j1 depends on the total number of segments on the market k. We
denote by j1(k) the number of segments as a function of k. Any optimal parti-
tion must be similar to partition P1, and the optimization problem for the data
intermediary boils down to choosing the number of segments j1(k) in partition
P1.
8
7Selling information to both firms is in general not optimal because it increases the com-
petitive pressure on the product market (Montes et al., 2018; Bounie et al., 2018), and thus
lowers the profits of the data intermediary, who extracts part of the surplus of the firms.
8See Bounie et al. (2018) for a more detailed discussion.
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Figure 2: Selling partition P1 to Firm 1
2.3 Firms
Without information, firms only know that consumers are uniformly distributed
on the unit line. When Firm 1 acquires j1(k) segments of information, it can
price discriminate consumers on these segments. Firm 1 sets prices in two
stages.9 First Firm 1 sets price p1 on the segment where it competes directly
with Firm 2 (the competitive segment). Secondly, Firm 1 sets a price on each
segment where it is in a monopoly position, with p1i being the price on the ith
segment from the origin. Firm 2 is uninformed but knows the price p1 set by
Firm 1 on the competitive segment, and sets a price p2 on the whole unit line.
We denote by dθi the demand of Firm θ on the ith segment.
10 Firm 1 is in-
formed and maximizes the following profit function with respect to p11, .., p1j1 , p1:
pi1 =
j1+1∑
i=1
d1ip1i =
j1∑
i=1
1
k
p1i + d1p1.
Firm 2 is uninformed and maximizes pi2 = d2p2 with respect to p2.
2.4 Timing
We summarize the timing of the game. The data intermediary first collects data
and sells the partition P1 to Firm 1. Then Firms 1 and 2 set prices on segments
where they compete. Finally Firm 1 sets prices on the monopolistic segments.
9Sequential pricing decision avoids the nonexistence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies,
and is supported by managerial practices (see for instance, Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006)).
10The marginal production costs are also normalized to zero.
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• Stage 1: the data intermediary collects data on k consumer segments.
• Stage 2: the data intermediary sells information partition P1 by choosing
the number of segments j1(k) to include in the partition.
• Stage 3: firms set prices p1 and p2 on the competitive segments.
• Stage 4: Firm 1 price discriminates consumers where it is in a monopoly
position by setting p1i, i ∈ [1, j1(k)].
The game is solved by backward induction. In stage 4, Firm 1 sets prices
p11, .., p1j1 on segments where it is in a monopoly position. In stage 3, Firm
1 and Firm 2 set prices p1 and p2 on the competitive segments. In stage 2,
we characterize the strategies of the data intermediary regarding how much
consumer information to sell to Firm 1 in Section 4. In stage 1, we determine how
much data the intermediary collects in equilibrium in Section 5. The strategies of
the firms and of the data intermediary critically depend on the way information
is sold, i.e. the selling mechanism, which influences the willingness to pay of the
firms for information.
3 Selling mechanisms
We analyze three mechanisms that have been extensively studied in the litera-
ture for final goods, that we apply to information goods: customized information
can be sold through a take it or leave it offer, a sequential bargaining, and si-
multaneous offers. First, under the take it or leave it selling mechanism, the
data intermediary proposes an information partition to Firm 1. After the offer
is made, there is no possibility for the data intermediary to sell information
to Firm 2, even if Firm 1 refuses the offer. This approach has been studied
for instance by Binmore et al. (1986). The second mechanism, the sequential
bargaining, allows the data intermediary to propose information to Firm 2 if
Firm 1 declines the offer, and so on until one of the firms acquires information.
This type of dynamic games has been studied for instance by Rubinstein (1982)
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or Sobel and Takahashi (1983). Thirdly, the data intermediary can sell infor-
mation to firms through simultaneous offers as in Bounie et al. (2018). The
data intermediary proposes to each firm an information partition that can be
different for Firm 1 and Firm 2 at different prices.
The three selling mechanisms have a major impact on the strategies of the
data intermediary and on the value of information. We compute for each selling
mechanism what a firm is ready to pay for information, and determine its outside
option if it does not purchase information. In the remainder of this section, we
show that the outside option can be used as a threat by the data intermediary
to extract more surplus from Firm 1.
We introduce further notations. We denote by pi1(j1) the profit of Firm 1
when it has information on the j1 consumer segments closest to its location
(Firm 2 is uninformed). In the take it or leave it format, if Firm 1 declines the
offer, Firm 2 is not informed either, and both firms are uninformed. In this case,
they set a single price on the unit line and make profits pi. In the sequential and
simultaneous offers formats, Firm 2 has information when Firm 1 is uninformed.
Let p¯i1(j2) denote the profit of Firm 1 when Firm 2 has information on the j2
consumer segments closest to its location.
It is also useful to define a data contract as a couple (j1, j2) where j1 is the
information proposed to Firm 1, and j2 is the information sold to Firm 2 if Firm
1 does not acquire information, which can include the empty set, for instance
in the take it or leave it offer.
Definition 1 (Data contract). A data contract is a couple (j1, j2).
We will show in Definition 2 and Theorem 1 that the three selling mecha-
nisms belong to a specific class of data contracts.
3.1 Take it or leave it
The data intermediary proposes information to Firm 1 that accepts or declines
the offer. If Firm 1 declines the offer, the data intermediary does not propose
10
information to Firm 2, and both Firm 1 and Firm 2 remain uninformed. This
selling mechanism rules out the possibility for the data intermediary to rene-
gotiate if no selling agreement is found, contrary to the sequential bargaining
format that we analyze in Section 3.2.11
The data intermediary makes an offer to Firm 1 that consists of an informa-
tion partition jtol1 , and a price of information ptol. Firm 1 can either accept the
offer and make profits pi1(j
tol
1 )−ptol, or reject the offer and make profits pi. The
data contract is therefore (jtol1 , ∅). Thus, the willingness to pay of Firm 1 for
information is pi1(j
tol
1 )− pi. The data intermediary sets the price of information
to:
ptol(j
tol
1 ) = pi1(j
tol
1 )− pi.
3.2 Sequential bargaining
Under the sequential bargaining mechanism, the data intermediary proposes
information to each firm sequentially, in an infinite bargaining game. There is
no discount factor and the game stops when one firm acquires information. At
each stage, the data intermediary proposes information jseqθ to Firm θ and no
information to Firm −θ.
Firm 1 can acquire information jseq1 and make profits pi1(j
seq
1 ), or decline the
offer, and the data intermediary proposes information jseq2 to Firm 2. If Firm
2 acquires information, the profits of Firm 1 are p¯i1(j
seq
2 ). If Firm 2 declines
the offer, the two previous stages are repeated. The data contract is therefore
(jseq1 , j
seq
2 ).
To compute the value of information under the sequential bargaining format,
we characterize a stationary equilibrium of this game where Firm 1 is making
profit pi1(j
seq
1 ) if it accepts the offer, but makes profits p¯i1(j
seq
2 ) if it declines
the offer and Firm 2 purchases information. It is important to stress that when
11The take it or leave it format includes in fact many such mechanisms where there is no
possibility for renegotiation, including Nash bargaining and menu pricing.
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Firm 1 declines the offer of the data intermediary, it will compete with Firm 2
that is proposed the symmetric partition (jseq2 is the symmetric of j
seq
1 ). We
show in Appendix B that the data intermediary sets the price of information
to:
pseq(j
seq
1 ) = pi1(j
seq
1 )− p¯i1(jseq2 ).
3.3 Simultaneous offers
Under the simultaneous offers, the data intermediary proposes simultaneously
to each firm an information structure and a price. The data intermediary can
design a data contract that maximizes the willingness to pay of Firm 1 (without
loss of generality). When Firm 1 acquires information, it makes profits pi1(j
so
1 )−
pso, where pso is the price of information. To maximize the threat on Firm 1,
the data intermediary proposes k segment of information to Firm 2, so that the
profit of Firm 1 without information is p¯i1(k), which is the worst case scenario.
The data contract is therefore (jso1 , k). The data intermediary sets the price of
information to:
pso(j
so
1 , k) = pi1(j
so
1 )− p¯i1(k)
4 Number of segments sold in equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the number of consumer segments sold to Firm
1 for each selling mechanism. We first establish that for a given k, the number
of consumer segments sold by the data intermediary is the same for the three
selling mechanisms (Proposition 1). We then show that the take it or leave
it, the sequential bargaining and the simultaneous offers mechanisms belong
to a class of data contracts that we refer to as independent data contracts.
These contracts have the property that the information proposed to Firm 2 is
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independent from the information proposed to Firm 1. Theorem 1 generalizes
Proposition 1 for independent data contracts.
4.1 Number of segments sold in equilibrium
We characterize in Proposition 1 the number of consumer segments sold to
Firm 1 in equilibrium under the take it or leave it, sequential bargaining and
simultaneous offers mechanisms.
Proposition 1
The number of consumer segments sold in equilibrium is:
jtol∗1 (k) = j
seq∗
1 (k) = j
sb∗
1 (k) =
6k − 9
14
.
Proof: see Appendix C.
The proof of Proposition 1 is based on the fact that the data intermediary
optimizes j1 and j2 independently. In other words, the information proposed to
Firm 1 (j1) is independent from the information proposed to Firm 2 (j2) if Firm
1 does not acquire information. It is the case for the take it or leave it and the
simultaneous offers mechanisms. Under the take it or leave it format, Firm 1
has no information when it declines the offer of the data intermediary, and thus
its outside option is independent with the information structure proposed by
the data intermediary to Firm 1. Under the simultaneous offers format, when
Firm 1 does not acquire information, Firm 2 has information on all consumer
segments. Thus, the outside option of Firm 1 that is affected by the partition
proposed to Firm 2 is independent from the partition proposed to Firm 1. Under
sequential bargaining, at each stage of the process, the firm who declines the
offer has no information, even though the competitor can acquire information
at the following stage. Here again, the outside option of Firm 1 is independent
from the information structure proposed by the data intermediary to Firm 1.
Regardless of the selling mechanism, when the outside option does not depend
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on j1, the data intermediary simply maximizes the profit of Firm 1 with respect
to j1.
4.2 Independent data contracts
Using the intuition developed in the previous section, we can generalize Propo-
sition 1 to a specific class of data contracts. These independent data contracts
have the property that the information sold to Firm 1 (j1) is independent from
the information proposed to Firm 2 (j2) if Firm 1 does not acquire information.
Theorem 1 shows that, for a given amount of data collected k, selling mecha-
nisms characterized by independent data contracts lead to the same number of
consumer segments sold to Firm 1 (j∗1 ).
Let (j1, j2) be the data contract proposed to Firm 1.
Definition 2 (Independent data contract)
A data contract (j1, j2) is independent if the data intermediary maximizes
profits by choosing j1 and j2 independently.
Definition 2 includes a large set of selling mechanisms such as various forms
of Nash and infinite sequential bargaining with discount factors, but also the
three selling mechanisms of the article. For instance, under a Nash bargaining
selling mechanism, the data intermediary maximizes with respect to j1 a share
of the joint profits with Firm 1, and does not propose information to Firm 2 if
the negotiation breaks down. Also, infinite sequential bargaining with discount
factors alternate offers to Firm 1 and to Firm 2 independently. However, there
are mechanisms that do not satisfy Definition 2. For instance, the data inter-
mediary can propose a symmetric partition to Firm 1, then to Firm 2 if Firm 1
declines the offer. The information structure proposed to Firm 1 appears in its
outside option: palt = pi1(j
alt
1 )− p¯i1(jalt1 ). Thus, the number of segments chosen
by the data intermediary affects both the profit of Firm 1 and its outside option,
violating Definition 2.
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Theorem 1 shows that for a given k, all selling mechanisms satisfying Defi-
nition 2 lead to the same number of consumer segments sold by the data inter-
mediary.
Theorem 1
Consider s and s′, two selling mechanisms that satisfy Definition 2:
∀ k, js∗1 (k) = js
′∗
1 (k).
Theorem 1 has theoretical and practical implications. First, Theorem 1 pro-
vides a first attempt to characterize data contracts based on their theoretical
properties. Other dimensions of interest include the length of the data contract,
exclusive sales, renegotiation conditions, or quantity discount.
Secondly, with independent data contracts, the data intermediary maximizes
the profits of Firm 1. Thus, the joint profits of the data intermediary and Firm
1 are maximized. This collusive behavior favors Firm 1 on the market, to
the detriment of Firm 2. This is not necessarily the case with other types of
contracts. For instance under symmetric offers analyzed in Section 6 the data
intermediary maximizes the willingness to pay of the second highest bidder, and
the interest of Firm 1 and the data intermediary are not aligned.
Thirdly, Theorem 1 offers a convenient criteria to assess the impact of a
selling mechanism on the amount of information sold on the market. Two
selling mechanisms that belong to the class of data contracts of Theorem 1
will always lead to the same number of consumer segments sold to Firm 1.
Thus a competition authority can analyze the properties of the data contract
to determine if an action is required to limit the amount of information sold on
a market.
We have shown in this section that the number of consumer segments sold
to Firm 1 does not vary with the selling mechanism. Next, we analyze how the
amount of data collected varies under different selling mechanisms.
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5 Collecting data in equilibrium
In this section we analyze how the profits of the data intermediary vary with
the number of consumer segments collected (k) for the three selling mecha-
nisms considered so far. The amount of data collected depends on the value
of information, which is determined by the outside option that varies with the
selling mechanism. Even though the data intermediary sells the same informa-
tion structure to firms under the different selling mechanisms, the number of
segments collected in the first stage of the game is not necessarily the same.12
The profit of the data intermediary Π ∈ {Πtol,Πseq,Πso} is given by the
price of information p ∈ {ptol, pseq, pso}, net of the cost of data collection c(k):13
Π(k) = p(k)− c(k).
We have established in Proposition 1 that the number of segments sold by
the data intermediary in the second stage of the model is the same for the
three selling mechanisms: j∗1 (k) =
6k−9
14 . Thus, selling mechanisms will only
impact the strategies of the data intermediary through the number of consumer
segments collected k. Indeed, different selling mechanisms will lead to different
prices for information, and thus to different amount of data collected by the
data intermediary.
Proposition 2 compares the number of segments collected by the data inter-
mediary and consumer surplus under the three selling mechanisms.
Proposition 2
The number of consumer segments collected k and consumer surplus CS are
inversely correlated:
kseq > kso > ktol, and CStol > CSso > CSseq.
Proof: see Appendix D.
12We assume that the cost of collecting data does not depend on the selling mechanism.
13We make the assumption that Πnet is concave and reaches a unique maximum on R+.
See Appendix A for a mathematical expression of this assumption.
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Proposition 2 shows that the number of consumer segments collected is min-
imized under the take it or leave it mechanism. The optimal level of data
collected depends on the marginal gain from increasing information precision.
This marginal gain is the lowest in the take it or leave it offer since the outside
option of the firm does not depend on any partition proposed by the data broker.
Thus, the surplus extraction effect is the weakest under this selling mechanism,
and consumer surplus is maximized.14 Proposition 2 sharply contrasts with the
existing literature that argues that information leads to higher consumer sur-
plus due to the competitive effect of information (Thisse and Vives, 1988; Stole,
2007). We show here that more information on the market can decrease con-
sumer surplus, because more information means more surplus extraction but
competition on the market remains low with the selling strategy of the data
intermediary.
Proposition 3 shows that the data intermediary chooses the simultaneous
offers mechanism, and that the take it or leave it is the least profitable selling
mechanism.
Proposition 3
The profits of the data intermediary are maximized under simultaneous offers
and minimized under the take it or leave it mechanism:
Πso > Πseq > Πtol.
Proof: see Appendix E.
Under the simultaneous offers mechanism, the data intermediary can maximize
the value of the threat of the outside option, and maximizes the willingness to
pay of Firm 1. On the contrary, under the take it or leave it mechanism, both
firms are uninformed when a firm rejects the offer of the data intermediary,
resulting in a lower willingness to pay of firms for information.
14The marginal gain is higher in the simultaneous offers mechanism since the data interme-
diary threatens the highest bidder with the harshest partition, P, which includes all consumer
segments. The marginal gain is highest under the sequential bargaining mechanism, since
collecting more data in that case increases the threat of the outside option the most.
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Proposition 3 is relevant for regulators. The data intermediary chooses the
simultaneous offers mechanism that maximizes its profits among the three mech-
anisms that we propose in this article. Thus a data intermediary will never
choose the take it or leave it mechanism. However, Proposition 2 shows that a
competition authority, concerned with consumer surplus, and a data protection
agency, concerned with the amount of consumer data collected, would choose
the take it or leave it format. Enforcing specific selling mechanisms is a simple
and powerful tool for regulators.
6 Extensions
6.1 Alternative selling mechanism
We analyze an alternative selling mechanism in which the data intermediary
simultaneously proposes symmetric partitions to both firms (symmetric offers,
indexed by sym). Such selling mechanism therefore does not verify Definition
2. We show that the main results of Sections 4 and 5 hold under this alternative
selling mechanism.
In the symmetric offers mechanism, the data intermediary proposes a par-
tition jsym1 to Firm 1. If Firm 1 declines the offer, a symmetric partition is
proposed to Firm 2. Such a mechanism can be enforced by a competition au-
thority to guarantee a level playing field. The price of information psym can
be written as follows: psym = pi1(j
sym
1 )− p¯i1(jsym1 ). The data contract does not
satisfy Definition 2 since jsym1 appears in the outside option of Firm 1. The
data intermediary will take this negative effect of jsym1 on the profits of Firm 1
when it declines the offer into account.
Proposition 4
The equilibrium with the symmetric offers mechanism has the following prop-
erties:
(a) jsym∗1 =
4k − 3
6
.
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(b) Πso > Πsym > Πseq > Πtol
(c) kseq > kso > ksym > ktol
(d) CSsym > CStol > CSso > CSseq.
Proof: see Appendix F.
First, the take it or leave it mechanism still minimizes the number of consumer
segments collected, so that a data protection agency would prefers it to any
other selling mechanism. Secondly, the data intermediary still chooses the si-
multaneous offers mechanism as it leads to the highest willingness to pay of Firm
1. Thus there is still a tension between private and public interests. Thirdly,
consumer surplus is now maximized in the symmetric offers mechanism. Thus
there is a new tradeoff between data protection agencies and competition au-
thorities. On the one hand, a data protection agency prefers the take it or leave
it mechanism that minimizes the amount of personal data collected. On the
other hand, a competition authority prefers the symmetric offers mechanism
that maximizes consumer surplus.
To sum-up, we have identified another class of selling mechanisms, where
partitions proposed to both firms are perfectly correlated and symmetric, under
which our main results hold. It remains to show that Propositions 4 also holds
for a broader set of classes. This is likely to be true given the fact that simul-
taneous offers is the selling mechanism that extracts the most surplus from the
firm who purchases information.
6.2 Selling information to both firms
We have focused our analysis on cases where the data intermediary sells informa-
tion to only one firm, and keeps the other firm uninformed. In this section, we
allow the data intermediary to sell information to both firms in a simultaneous
offer.15
15We focus on simultaneous offers as it is the only mechanism among the three considered
where the data intermediary can sell information to both firms simultaneously.
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The data intermediary can sell symmetric information to both firms at the
price pboth = pi1(j
both
1 ) − p¯i1(jboth1 ).16 Thus the profit of the data intermediary
in that case is Πboth(k) = 2pboth − c(k).
We characterize in Proposition 5 the profit of the data intermediary, the
number of consumer segments collected, and consumer surplus when the data
intermediary sells information to both firms, and we rank these values.
Proposition 5
When the data intermediary can sell information to both firms, the equilib-
rium has the following properties:
(a) jboth∗ =
6k − 9
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(b) Πso > Πseq > Πboth > Πtol
(c) kseq > kso > kboth > ktol
(d) CSboth > CStol > CSso > CSseq.
Proof: see Appendix G.
The data intermediary optimally sells information to one firm under the se-
quential bargaining and the simultaneous offers mechanisms, but prefers to sell
information to both firms rather than selling to one firm under the take it or
leave it mechanism. All results of Sections 4 and 5 hold when the data interme-
diary is allowed to sell information to both firms. First, the take it or leave it
mechanism is still optimal for consumers: the data intermediary chooses to sell
information to both firms, which minimizes the number of consumer segments
collected and maximizes consumer surplus compared to sequential bargaining
and simultaneous offers. A data protection agency and a competition author-
ity would still prefer the take it or leave offers mechanism to any other selling
mechanism. Secondly, the data intermediary still prefers selling information to
16The symmetry of the information structure when the data intermediary sells information
to both firms is shown in Bounie et al. (2018)
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one firm under the simultaneous offers mechanism as it leads to the highest
willingness to pay of Firm 1. Thus there is still a tension between private and
public interests. The tradeoff between data protection agencies and competition
authorities remains. On the one hand, a data protection agency would prefer
a situation where only one firm is informed since in that case the number of
consumer segments collected and sold is minimized. On the other hand, a com-
petition authority would prefer a situation where both firms are informed since
consumer surplus is maximized in that case.
7 Conclusion
With the rise of digital giants such as Facebook, Apple, Google and Amazon,
access to data and information is now central for competition policy in the digital
era. As Cre´mer et al. (2019) emphasize, data create a high barrier to entry on
a market, which encourages the emergence of dominant firms. The strategic
role of data has led the FTC and the European Commission, concerned with
potential anticompetitive practices, to increase their scrutiny of the activity of
web giants.17
A first central contribution of this paper is to show that it is not only crucial
to take access to data into account, but also to consider differentiated access to
consumer data. Indeed, we have shown that data intermediaries can influence
competition on product markets by selling different information to firms. Our
main results indicate that the design of the market for information is of most
importance for the data strategies of market participants. We have focused on
selling mechanisms, but other dimensions matter, such as for instance resolving
information asymmetries between sellers and buyers of information (Bergemann
and Bonatti, 2015)
The second main contribution of this paper is to emphasize the importance
17Congress, Enforcement Agencies Target Tech; Google, Facebook and Apple could face US
antitrust probes as regulators divide up tech territory; If you want to know what a US tech
crackdown may look like, check out what Europe did.
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of the mechanism through which consumer information is sold on the strategies
of data intermediaries regarding how much consumer information they collect
and sell. We argue that policy makers could feel uneasy about leaving the
market for information unregulated. First, data intermediaries prefer selling
information through simultaneous offers that allow firms to extract more con-
sumer surplus. In turn, data intermediaries can raise the price of information,
and gain market power. Competition authorities could be worried about the
resulting market dominance. Secondly, data intermediaries will choose a selling
mechanism that maximizes the amount of data collected, which can raise pri-
vacy concerns. Indeed, recent legislations such as the European GDPR impose
a data minimization principle.
Data intermediaries are growing fast, collecting any type of information on
huge masses of consumers.18 It is therefore important to know how much per-
sonal information data intermediaries collect to understand their strategies with
respect to collecting and selling consumer information. Controlling the mecha-
nism through which consumer information is sold is a simple yet powerful tool
to minimize consumer data collection.
18Data brokers: regulators try to rein in the ‘privacy deathstars’.
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A Mathematical interpretation of Assumption
1
The cost function is defined such that:

∂2[p(k)−c(k)]
∂k2 < 0 and ∃! k∗ s.t. ∂[p(k)−c(k)]∂k = 0
∂2[p(k)−c(k)]
∂k2 < 0 and ∃! k∗ s.t. ∂[p(k)−c(k)]∂k = 0
∃! k∗ s.t. ∂Π∂k = 0 and Π(k∗) ≥ 0
c(0) = 0
This technical hypothesis is common in the literature. It allows profits to
be maximized in a unique point, which is usually true for linear cost functions.
B Proof of optimal prices in sequential bargain-
ing
We propose a candidate equilibrium policy function. We show that pseq =
pi1(j
seq
1 )− p¯i1(jseq2 ) is an SPE. As only the data intermediary has a non binary
choice, uniqueness will result naturally.
We write V1 the value function of Firm 1 in stage 1 to determine its willing-
ness to pay:

V1 + pi1(j
seq
1 )− pseq if Firm 1 accepts the offer,
p¯i1(j
seq
2 ) if Firm 1 declines the offer and Firm 2 accepts the offer,
V1 if Firm 2 declines the offer.
Thus, the overall value of Firm 1 is:
V1 + pi1(j
seq
1 )− pseq − p¯i1(jseq2 )− V1 = pi1(jseq1 )− pseq − p¯i1(jseq2 )
Thus:
pseq = pi1(j
seq
1 )− p¯i1(jseq2 )
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The data intermediary has no interest in deviating from this value, as low-
ering pseq would decrease its profits, and increasing pseq would have Firm 1
rejecting the offer. Thus pseq = pi1(j
seq
1 ) − p¯i1(jseq2 ) is the unique SPE of this
game.
C Proof of Proposition 1
We prove that the optimal partition in equilibrium does not depend on the
selling mechanism.
The data intermediary profit functions in the different timings are:
pso(P1,P2) = pi
I,NI
1 (P1, ∅)− piNI,I1 (∅,Pref )
ptol = pi
I,NI
1 (P1, ∅)− piNI,NI1
pseq = pi
I,NI
1 (P1, ∅)− piNI,I1 (∅,P2)
It is immediate to see that in each mechanism, the data intermediary chooses
P1 in order to maximize the profits of Firm 1. Thus, the optimal information
structure in equilibrium P∗1 does not depend on the selling mechanism.
Prices and demands on the unit line are identical to Bounie et al. (2018) and
can be written as follow:
p1 = t[1− 43 jk ]; p1i = 2t[1− ik − 13 jk ]; d1 = 12 − 23 jk .
Profits are:19
pi∗1 =
j∑
i=1
2t
k
[1− i
k
− 1
3
j
k
] +
t
2
(1− 4
3
j
k
)2 (1)
Thus, first order conditions on pi1 gives us
j∗1 (k) =
6k − 9
14
.
19For p1i ≥ 0 =⇒ jk ≤ 34 . Profits are equal whatever jk ≥ 34 .
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D Proof of Proposition 2
Data collection
We compare the first derivative of the profits of the data intermediary in the
different mechanisms in order to compare the optimal precisions in equilibrium.
∂p∗so
∂k
=
(19k − 11)t
28k3
,
∂p∗tol
∂k
=
(6k − 9)t
14k3
,
∂p∗seq
∂k
=
(72k − 45)t
98k3
.
Comparing the derivatives gives us:
∂p∗seq
∂k
>
∂p∗so
∂k
>
∂p∗tol
∂k
.
From the convexity of the cost function, it is straightforward that:
kseq > kso > ktol
Consumer surplus
Prices when the data intermediaries sells j segments of information to Firm
1 are given in Bounie et al. (2018) and are as follow:
• Firm 1 captures all demand on each segment i = 1, .., j, and:
p1i = 2t[1− i
k
− 1
3
j
k
].
• Firms compete on the segment of unidentified consumers, and the prices
are:
p1 = t[1− 4
3
j
k
], and p2 = t[1− 2
3
j
k
].
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We need to compute demands in order to find consumer surplus. On the j
segments of size 1k where Firm 1 has information, it is a monopolist and demand
is 1k on each segment.
On the segment of unidentified consumers, where firms compete, the indif-
ferent consumer is characterized by
x˜ =
p2 − p1 + t
2t
+
j
k
=⇒ x˜ = 4
3
j
k
As j∗ = 6k−914 , x˜
∗ = 4k−127k .
We can write consumer surplus in equilibrium:
CS(k) =
j∗∑
i=1
[
∫ 1
k
0
V − 2t[1− 1
3
j
k
] +
t
k
+
it
k
− txdx]
+
∫ 1
2+
j∗
3k
j∗
k
V − t[1− 4
3
j∗
k
]− txdx+
∫ 1
2− j
∗
3k
0
V − t[1− 2
3
j∗
k
]− txdx
=
j∗−1∑
i=0
1
k
[V − 2t[1− 1
3
j∗
k
] +
t
k
+
it
k
]− j
∗t
2k2
+ V [1− j
∗
k
]− [ 1
2
− 2j
∗
3k
][t− 4
3
j∗t
k
]− t
2
[
1
4
− 8
9
j∗2
k2
+
j∗
3k
]
− [ 1
2
− j
∗
3k
][t− 2
3
j∗t
k
]− t
2
[
1
2
− 1
3
j∗
k
]2
=
j∗
k
[V − 2t[1− 1
3
j∗
k
] +
t
k
] +
j∗(j∗ − 1)t
k2
− j
∗t
2k2
+ V [1− j
∗
k
]− t
2
[1 +
16j∗2
9k2
− 8j
∗
3k
]− t
2
[
1
4
− 8
9
j∗2
k2
+
j∗
3k
]
− t
2
[1 +
4
9
j∗2
k2
− 4j
∗
3k
]− t
2
[
1
4
− 1
3
j∗
k
+
j∗2
9k2
]
= V − 2j
∗t
k
− j
∗t
2k2
+
2j∗2t
3k2
− 5t
4
+ 2t
j∗
k
− 13t
18
j∗2
k2
= V − 5t
4
− j
∗t
2k2
− 7j
∗2t
18k2
= − (170k
2 − 144k − 9)t− 56V k2
56k2
(2)
Consider now the first degree derivative of consumer surplus with respect to
k:
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∂CS(k)
∂k
= − 9t
28k3
This is always negative for k ≥ 0, and thus consumer surplus decreases with
information precision.
E Proof of Proposition 3
We compare the profits of the data intermediary in the different selling mech-
anisms. The profits of the firms depending on the information structure are
provided in Bounie et al. (2018):
piNI,NI =
t
2
.
piI,NI(j∗1 , ∅) =
(18k2 − 12k + 9)t
28k2
.
piNI,I(∅,Pref ) = (k
2 + 2k + 1)t
8k2
.
piNI,I(∅, j∗1 ) =
(25k2 + 30k + 9)t
98k2
.
Profits are found directly from these values:
p∗so = pi
I,NI(j∗1 , ∅)− piNI,I(∅,Pref ) =
(29k2 − 38k + 11)t
56k2
p∗tol = pi
I,NI(j∗1 , ∅)− piNI,NI =
(4k2 − 12k + 9)t
28k2
pseq = pi
I,NI(j∗1 , ∅)− piNI,I(∅, j∗1 ) =
(76k2 − 144k + 45)t
196k2
Direct comparison of the profits provide the ranking of Proposition 2.
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F Proof of Proposition 4
In the alternative mechanism, the price of information can be written
palt = pi1(j
alt
1 )− p¯i1(jalt1 ).
FOC on palt with respect to j
alt
1 gives us:
4k − 3
6
,
p∗alt =
4t
9
− 2t
3k
+
t
9k2
and
∂p∗alt
∂k
=
(6k − 2)t
9k3
.
The ranking of profits, surplus, and optimal data collection is then straight-
forward.
G Proof of Proposition 5
The profit of the data intermediary when selling information to both firms in a
take it or leave it offer is provided in Bounie et al. (2018) and has the following
value:
Πboth(k) =
2t
11
− 6t
11k
+
9t
22k2
− c(k),
and the first-degree derivative of the profit function with respect to k is:
(6k − 9)
11k3
− c′(k).
Finally, consumer surplus in this case is
(445k2 + 216k + 36)t+ 484V k2
484k2
.
Straightforward comparisons with the values in Appendix E lead to the
rankings in Proposition 5.
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